In advanced economies, Hall and Soskice rely on a super lit index made by Estevez-Abe, Iverson, and Soskice to measure employment protection, but EMs don't have the same dope measures cuz the data is hella unclear. The core components of the Estevez- Abe et al measure are like totally not available for developing countries and like, we need an alternative indicator, ya know? The flex in unemployment shows how stable the job scene is, ya know? Where there's, like, a higher level of annual turnover, labour markets tend to be hella competitive, or liberal, and where changes of employment hold more stable, labour markets are all about that cooperative coordination, you know?
The resulting scatter plot is like the EM version of Hall and Soskice's OG mapping of institutional complements.
To peep CME vs LME vibes in EMs, I flex the typological vibes of a subset of EMs. I use the same cap and labor market indicators from the OG Hall and Soskice framework but flex the measures to be relevant in an EM framework (figure 2.2). Hall and Soskice use stock market cap on the x-axis and employment protection on the y-axis (2001). In an EM context, I use the ratio of stonks market cap to domestic private credit for the x-axis. OMG, like the stock market cap is all about the size of the equity markets and how developed they are. So, to measure the capital market trends, we gotta use this ratio of equity to bank capital. It's like a way to make it fair for countries at different levels of development. Remember that example with India's market cap and liquidity? Yeah, we had to think about their per capita GDP to analyze their stock market. So important, right? The ratio lowkey be flexin' how much you rely on bank money versus your own cash. For labor, in an EM context, I use the avg change in unemployment over a global biz cycle (2002-2009).45 ⦁ Mapping Emergent Typologies, famAt the core of capitalist typologies are mad trade-offs between and amongst stakeholders that determine how much collective action is present in capital and labour markets, ya know? Where firms are able to flex with incentive vibes that are consistent across capital and labour markets, they develop mad efficiencies and achieve levels of competitiveness that are not easily achieved otherwise. When compliments don't vibe with either competition or cooperation, the state becomes hella important in understanding capitalist structures, ya know?
OMG, Section 2.4 is all about the lit dichotomies of typologies and how they're rooted in collectivisation.
It's like setting the framework for analysis and building on the sick empirical framework that Hall & Soskice developed in their first review of market typologies. So dope! The OG coop coordination (CME) - comp (LME) divide was proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001) and was further developed in subsequent papers (e.g. Hall and Gingerich 2009). Even haters of the basic coop coord-comp index know that coord and comp show how peeps work together in the econ game (check out Kenworthy 2006 for deets). That economies be flexin' somewhere in between a coordinated and competitive framework should be no cap, since any negotiation of interests will straight up lead to balancing of extremes. Critics, who peep the existence of coop vibes in LMEs and the competitive flex in CMEs as proof that VoC theory can't vibe together (Hay 2005), miss the bigger drip of the theory. Fitting into an LME typology doesn't automatically mean every economic function in that economy is competitive, and fitting into a CME typology doesn't automatically mean every economic function in that economy is cooperative. Markets are hella complex and they're filled with a bunch of different ways people can coordinate in different sectors, ya know? The tea is to peep where the biggest flexes are achieved in the market, 'cause that's where productivity and economic growth gonna be lit af. The level of vibes in the core, value-add aspects of the economy can be categorized within a CME- MME-LME framework.EMs be like a whole new vibe for VoC theory, ya know?
The struggle of applying the theory in an EM context is that developmental state legacies combine with immature institutions, factors that make complementary relationships hella complicated. OMG, like EMs today weren't even the OGs of industrializing, so states were always stepping in to flex on the microeconomy and make it lit to catch up, ya know? State intervention be changing up incentive sets domestically, ya know? Such changes may be lit in the beginning stages as the gains on capital make up for the expenses, but as the economy grows, the expenses (usually shown as fiscal deficits) become more and more not sustainable.44 Over time, like, too much or like, not efficient state intervention leads to major probs in the job and money markets (check out Nolke 2012; Feldmann 2007). The glow-up from being a baby state to flexing a market economy ain't always a piece of cake. Where these transitions are like, hella problematic, the state often be facing fiscal deficits and, if the situation gets worse cuz of inefficient domestic consumption, it's a whole balance of payments crisis, fam. (Hancké et al 2007). The whole vibe of complement interaction in the two base typologies is what sets the stage for the CME/LME typologies, with MMEs being used to describe markets that are in the middle, you know?
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